Testing and defence led by a published security researcher with five CVEs, including a CVSS 9.1 Mirai botnet kill-switch.
All security →SOC 2, ISO, and the Canadian privacy stack, run end to end with an independent auditor.
All frameworks →Original research, free tools, and plain-language guides on security and compliance, from a published security researcher.
Read the blog →You built it fast with AI. That is the point, and it is cheaper than hiring a dev team to build it in the first place. But AI is not there yet: it ships logic flaws, security holes, and overlooked edge cases with total confidence. Before you put it in front of customers or investors, have someone who breaks software for a living make sure it is actually good.
Most people who call us about this are at the same moment: the thing is built, the demo goes well, and they are about to put real customer data into it. Then the question lands. Do we actually know this is okay?
This is not an argument against building with AI. Build with AI. The tools are genuinely good at producing working software quickly, and that is why this service exists at the price it does. But they are not there yet on the things that only show up under pressure, and they never tell you when they are unsure. The output looks identical whether it is right or wrong. That is the actual risk.
We QA, security-review, fuzz, and penetration test your vibe-coded product, then hand you a clear list of what is broken, what is exploitable, and how to fix it. Testing is delivered with our offensive-security partner and led by a published security researcher with 5 CVEs, so the findings reflect real attacker behavior rather than a checklist.
Think about what you skipped. Hiring engineers, months of build time, the salary or the agency invoice. AI did that part for a fraction of the cost, and it did it in a fraction of the time. That saving is real and you should keep it.
A review is a defined, one-time cost on top of a build that already came in far below what it would have cost conventionally. Add the two together and you are still well under the old number, and now you know what you are shipping. You are paying for the one thing AI cannot do yet: know what it got wrong.
The alternative is finding out later. A leaked customer record, an auth bug in front of your first enterprise buyer, or a rewrite six months in because the foundation was never checked. Those are not fixed-cost problems. Send us the app and we will scope the review before you commit to it.
Written to be acted on. You can hand most of it straight back to your AI tool and have the fixes made the same way you built it.
The QA findings: broken flows, wrong logic, edge cases that fail. Reproduction steps for each one, so nothing is a guessing game.
The security findings, ranked by what an attacker could actually do with them, not by CVSS score alone. Proof, not theory.
Specific remediation for each finding, in priority order. Clear enough to paste into your AI tool or hand to a developer without a translation layer.
The pen test portion can be scoped and reported as evidence for SOC 2, ISO 27001, or a buyer's security questionnaire, so the same work answers the next customer who asks.
Tell us what you built, what it holds, and who is about to use it. We will scope the review and tell you honestly how worried to be.
Get your vibe-coded app reviewedIt is a QA, security review, fuzzing, and penetration test of software you built with AI coding tools. AI is fast but still ships logic flaws, security gaps, and overlooked edge cases. We review the AI-generated code, fuzz it, and pen test it so you can ship with confidence, still for far less than hiring a full development team to build it from scratch. It is aimed at startups and anyone shipping vibe-coded products.
The pattern we see is confident code with gaps underneath. Missing authorization checks, so an endpoint authenticates the user but never verifies they are allowed to touch that record. Logic flaws, where the happy path works and the edge cases quietly do the wrong thing. Silent omissions, where the model simply did not write the check you assumed was there. Unsafe defaults carried over from training data, and the auth gaps, injection, and secret leaks AI routinely introduces. None of it looks wrong on the screen, which is the problem.
That is the whole point. Building it with AI already cost you a fraction of what an engineering team would have. A review adds a defined, one-time cost on top of that and still lands well under what building it conventionally would have run. You are paying for the part AI cannot do yet, which is knowing what it got wrong.
No. We work from the running application and the code, whatever produced them. The failure patterns are broadly similar across AI coding tools, and we test the software in front of us rather than assuming anything about how it was written.
The default deliverable is a clear, prioritized list of what is broken, what is exploitable, and how to fix it, written so you can hand it straight back to your AI tool or a developer. If you would rather we make the fixes ourselves, our custom development team can, as a separate scope.
Yes. The penetration testing portion can be scoped and reported to serve as evidence for SOC 2, ISO 27001, and buyer security questionnaires. If a customer is asking for the whole framework rather than just a test report, our compliance team handles readiness and audit prep end to end.
PCI DSS is unusually specific here: the reviewer cannot be the person who wrote the code. That independence requirement is the reason this gets outsourced.
| Framework | Status | What the requirement says |
|---|---|---|
| PCI DSS v4.0Requirement 6.2.3 | Required | Bespoke and custom software must be reviewed prior to release, and the review must be performed by individuals other than the originating code author who are knowledgeable about code review techniques and secure coding practices. |
| PCI DSS v4.0Requirement 6.2.4 | Required | Software engineering techniques must prevent or mitigate common software attacks in bespoke and custom software. |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022A.8.25, A.8.28 and A.8.29 | Expected | A secure development lifecycle, secure coding principles, and security testing in development and acceptance. |
| SOC 2CC8.1 | Expected | Changes to infrastructure, data, software and procedures must be authorised, designed, developed, configured, documented, tested, approved and implemented. |
The independence wording in 6.2.3 is the part worth reading twice. A small engineering team where everyone reviews everyone can satisfy it internally. A team where one person writes most of the code that touches the cardholder data environment usually cannot, and that is when this becomes a purchase rather than a process change.
Track record
We are deliberately not a large firm, and we would rather show you the work than a wall of logos. Here is what is behind the advice.
Five published CVEs. CVE-2024-45163 (CVSS 9.1) is a flaw in the Mirai botnet itself, which gave defenders a way to shut down attacker infrastructure. CVE-2026-42626 takes HP ENVY 5000 printers offline from any unauthenticated device on the same network.
The printer is the one that matters on a compliance page: an asset nobody counts as a computer, on a flat network, downed by a device that never had to log in. Auditors ask how controls fail. We have found out first-hand.
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